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Surveys indicate that judges believe at least one tenth of the lawyers in
practice today are ineffective and harmful to their clients' cases.2 Indigent
criminal defendants appear to receive particularly poor representation from
their appointed attorneys.3 To deal with this problem, state supreme courts
and federal circuit courts developed a conflicting array of tests for determining
the standard of effectiveness counsel must meet to fulfill a criminal defen-
dant's sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel.4 Not only did these
courts disagree on the standard to be used for judging attorney performance;
they also split on whether a defendant making an ineffective assistance claim
must show prejudice resulting from the constitutionally inadequate
performance. 5
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court at-
tempted to develop a uniform framework for analyzing ineffective assistance
claims. Strickland is significant because it is the first case in which the Court
has broadly addressed the issue of actual ineffective assistance of counsel.6 The
Court held the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably
1. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
2. Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role,
93 HARV. L. REV. 633, 634 n.7 (1980).
3. Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia states that in his experience he has found that many-if not most-indigent
defendants are represented by such ineffective lawyers that their constitutional right to
counsel is violated. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv.
1, 2 (1973).
4. See 5 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 2D Ineffective Assistance of Counsel §§ 2,
13 (1975).
5. Id.
6. 104 S. Ct. at 2062.
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effective assistance.7 On the issue of prejudice, the Court held that a defen-
dant making an ineffectiveness claim must show that there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the challenged proceeding would have been dif-
ferent but for counsel's inadequate assistance.8
In September 1976, David L. Washington and two accomplices kid-
napped and murdered three people.' After the arrest of his accomplices,
Washington surrendered to police and confessed to one of the murders. Wash-
ington was indicted for kidnapping, robbery, and murder. The state of Florida
appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Against the law-
yer's advice, Washington confessed to the other two murders, causing his
counsel to feel hopeless about the case. At trial, defendant Washington ig-
nored counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including three capi-
tal murder charges. 10 Defendant told the judge that he had no significant prior
criminal record and at the time of the murders was distressed by his inability
to support his family. Defendant rejected counsel's advice to have an advisory
jury at his capital sentencing hearing and chose to be sentenced by the trial
judge alone.'1
Counsel spoke with defendant about his background, but decided not to
present character witnesses or psychiatric testimony at the sentencing hearing.
Counsel believed defendant's prior plea colloquy provided enough information
about defendant's background and mental state. Further, counsel wanted to
avoid state cross-examination of defendant about his claim of mental distress
and prevent the state from presenting its own psychiatric evidence. A
presentence report was not prepared because counsel believed it would be
harmful to defendant since it would contain a greater criminal history than
defendant had related to the judge.22
At the sentencing hearing, counsel argued that several mitigating circum-
stances justified not imposing the death penalty in the case. First, defendant
had no "significant" history of criminal acts. 3 Second, defendant was under
7. Id. at 2064.
8. Id. at 2068.
9. Id. at 2056.
10. Id. at 2057.
11. Id.
12. To prepare for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke with the defendant
and the defendant's wife and mother, but did not seek out other possible character
witnesses. Counsel chose not to seek a psychiatric examination of defendant because his
conversations with defendant did not indicate defendant had any psychological
problems. Counsel was successful in having potentially damaging evidence excluded
from the sentencing hearing. He was able to exclude defendant's "rap sheet." Counsel's
strategy at the sentencing hearing was based on the trial judge's remarks to defendant
that the judge had a "great deal of respect for people who are willing to . . . admit
responsibilty" for their acts and the judge's reputation as a sentencing judge who
thought it important for defendants to admit responsibility for their crimes. Id.
13. In fact, defendant admitted that he had engaged in a course of burglaries
and had stolen property for some time. However, no evidence of prior convictions was
presented at the sentencing hearing. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663 (Fla.
[Vol. 50
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extreme mental distress at the time of the murders. Third, his surrender, con-
fession, and agreement to testify against a co-defendant showed defendant's
good character and remorse. Nevertheless, the trial judge found the aggravat-
ing circumstances greatly outweighed any mitigating circumstances and sen-
tenced defendant to death.14
Defendant then sought collateral relief in state court, asserting that coun-
sel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing.' 5 Defendant
argued counsel's assistance was ineffective because he had failed to investigate
non-statutory mitigating factors.1 6 The case reached the Florida Supreme
Court, but all state courts denied relief.17 Defendant then filed for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court, asserting the same ineffective assis-
tance claim. 8 The district court denied relief, but the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case so that the lower court could apply
newly announced standards.19
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979). For a list of statutory mitigating factors
judges are to consider under Florida's capital sentencing law, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(6) (West 1973).
14. The aggravating circumstances found by the court included the fact that
the murders were especially heinous and cruel, involving multiple stabbings. All the
murders were committed in the course of robberies and were committed for financial
gain. In addition to imposing the death penalty for three counts of capital murder,
defendant received numerous prison sentences for robbery, kidnapping, breaking and
entering, assault, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The death sentence and prison
sentences were affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court on direct review. Washington v.
State, 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
15. 104 S. Ct. at 2058.
16. Specifically, defendant argued counsel's assistance was ineffective because
he had failed to move for a continuance, to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychi-
atric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence inves-
tigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to inves-
tigate and cross-examine medical experts who testified as to the manner of the killings.
In support of the claim, defendant submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors
and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so. He also submitted
two psychological reports stating that defendant was "chronically frustrated and de-
pressed because of his economic dilemma" at the time of his crimes. Id.
17. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla. 1981).
18. 104 S. Ct. at 2060.
19. The appeal from the district court was originally heard before the Fifth
Circuit. 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1982). However, that decision was vacated when the
circuits were realigned so that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the eleventh cir-
cuit. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc and held that
defendant was entitled to "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." Washington v. Strickland,
693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In addition, the
court held defendant must show that counsel's errors resulted in actual and substantial
disadvantage to the course of the defense. Such a showing of prejudice required a judg-
ment for defendant unless the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that counsel's
ineffectiveness was harmless. Id. at 1262; see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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The Court held the proper standard for attorney performance is that of rea-
sonably effective assistance.20 The Court, however, adopted a different stan-
dard of prejudice than that used by the court of appeals. The Court held de-
fendant must show there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different but for counsel's unprofesssional er-
rors. 21 Applying these standards to the facts of this case, the Court held that
counsel's performance was within the broad range of reasonableness and, al-
ternatively, the defendant had not shown sufficient prejudice to justify setting
aside his death sentence.
22
Justice Marshall dissented. He believed the reasonably effective assistance
standard was too vague for lower courts to apply and would prevent them from
devising more precise standards. 23 Justice Marshall would dispense with the
prejudice requirement and hold that if a defendant shows counsel departed
from a standard of effectiveness, a new trial is mandated. He argued that both
guilty and innocent defendants have a due process right to fundamentally fair
procedures, and a prejudice requirement violates this right.24
The sixth amendment ensures that defendants in a criminal case shall
have the right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. 25 In this century,
the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the scope and meaning of the right
to counsel28 so that today no defendant may be imprisoned for any offense
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial or made a valid waiver of that
right.2 7
Prior to the 1960's, there were few ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, but their number increased dramatically as that decade progressed.
20. 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
21. Id. at 2068.
22. Id. at 2070. Justice Brennan concurred in that part of the opinion announc-
ing the standards by which to judge a claim of ineffective assistance, but dissented
from the Court's judgment. Because Brennan believed the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment and violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments, he would have
vacated defendant's death sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
at 2072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2075 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2077.
25. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. There are other
remedies available to a party who has received ineffective assistance. For example, the
party may request that the bar discipline the attorney for incompetence. In addition,
the party may sue the attorney for malpractice. However, malpractice suits are costly
and damages are difficult to recover. Further, damages may be inadequate compensa-
tion to a defendant who has suffered a criminal conviction and incarceration (or a
death sentence) because of counsel's ineffectiveness. See Schwarzer, supra note 2, at
633 and 646-49. Therefore, the sixth amendment right is necessary to provide addi-
tional protection in criminal cases.
26. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
27. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
[Vol. 50
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Courts became more willing to examine criminal trials for defects. 28 The re-
quirement that indigents receive appointed counsel for their defense increased
the number of attorneys handling criminal cases.29 In addition, standards of
professional conduct made it more difficult for attorneys to refuse appointment
in a criminal case.30
The Supreme Court has stated clearly that the right to counsel is the
right to "effective" counsel. 31 One commentator defines an effective counsel as
one who makes certain the defendant receives" the substantive and procedural
protections mandated by law and ensures that the outcome of the case reflects
a fair determination of the facts and the law.32 Prior to Strickland, however,
the Supreme Court had left the lower courts to develop standards for evaluat-
ing ineffective assistance claims. This resulted in a wide variation in tests and
standards. 3
3
Claims of ineffective assistance may be based on counsel's performance
before, during, or after trial. The most common claim is that counsel was inef-
fective at the trial itself, even though this claim is the most difficult for defen-
dants to prove.3 4 Defendants have been most successful in arguing that counsel
inadequately prepared the case or did not investigate it properly prior to
trial. 35 Claims of ineffectiveness may also arise after conviction where, for ex-
ample, the attorney is incompetent in foregoing or exercising a right to
appeal.36
28. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New
Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REv. 443, 444 (1977).
29. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
30. "All qualified trial lawyers should stand ready to undertake the defense of
an accused regardless of public hostility toward the accused or personal distaste for the
offense charged or the person of the defendant." A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.5(b) (2d ed. 1980).
31. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
32. Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 299, 341 (1983).
33. The prior history of Strickland illustrates this problem. The state and fed-
eral courts which ruled on the case agreed that defendant has the burden to show
counsel's performance fell below a standard of reasonable effectiveness, but they split
on the issue of prejudice. The state courts held defendant must show counsel's ineffec-
tiveness likely affected the outcome of the proceeding. By contrast, the federal court of
appeals held defendant need only show counsel's ineffectiveness substantially disadvan-
taged the course of his defense. Both the state and federal courts held the state should
have the opportunity to rebut defendant's showing of prejudice by proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that counsel's ineffectiveness was in fact harmless to the proceeding's
outcome. The case, therefore, presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
clarify the law in this area. For a good discussion of the case's history, see Harper,
Effective Assistance of Counsel-Evolution of the Standard, 58 FLA. B.J. 58, 59
(1984).
34. Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo.
L. REV. 483, 488 (1976).
35. Id. at 485.
36. Id. at 492. Ineffectiveness claims also may arise in other contexts. For ex-
1985]
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The first problem courts faced in deciding ineffective assistance claims
was developing a standard for judging ineffectiveness. In devising any stan-
dard, courts must discount the effect of hindsight in judging the actions of
counsel. In addition, courts must grant counsel wide discretion in making stra-
tegic and tactical decisions in the course of the case. 7
The earliest standard to emerge in the federal courts was the "farce and
mockery" standard.3 8 This standard required defendant to show that the pro-
ceedings against him were reduced to a farce and mockery of justice because
of counsel's ineffectiveness. The farce and mockery standard was based on the
notion that the policy of finality in criminal cases should take precedence over
claims of ineffective assistance except in the most severe cases of attorney in-
competence. 39 The standard was adopted when the sixth amendment was in-
terpreted to require only the appointment of counsel." Courts had not then
held that the sixth amendment guaranteed effective assistance.41 Therefore, a
federal defendant making an ineffectiveness claim had to base his claim on the
fifth amendment's due process clause which guaranteed defendants the right
to a fair trial.42 Eventually, the farce and mockery standard was applied to
sixth amendment claims as well.4 3
The farce and mockery standard was greatly criticized. Critics noted that
the standard held attorneys to a lower standard of performance than that re-
quired in other professions." The test was vague and ignored the fact that
ample, the defendant in Strickland challenged counsel's preparation and performance
preparing at a capital sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court chose to treat a capital
sentencing hearing like a trial for the purpose of analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The
Court believed a capital sentencing proceeding was like a trial in its adversarial format
so that counsel's role in the proceeding would be the same as that in a trial, i.e., to
ensure the adversarial process works to produce a just and reliable result. The Court
noted that in less formal proceedings than a trial, a different approach to attorney
ineffectiveness might be required by the Constitution. For example, the Court stated
that an ordinary sentencing hearing might mandate a different test of effective assis-
tance because informal procedures may be used and the sentencer may have stand-
ardless discretion. Thus, Strickland leaves open the possibility that the Court may de-
velop other tests for judging attorney ineffectiveness in contexts other than a trial or
capital sentencing proceeding. 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
37. Goodpaster, supra note 32, at 343.
38. For a discussion of the origin of the standard, see Beasley v. United States,
491 F.2d 687, 693-94 (6th Cir. 1974). This standard was announced in Diggs v.
Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
39. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation In Criminal Cases: Depar-
tures From Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927, 929 (1973).
40. Beasley, 491 F.2d at 694.
41. Id.
42. Id. The farce and mockery test was derived from the traditional "sham or
pretense" test used in old fair trial cases arising under the fifth amendment's due pro-
cess clause. Strazzella, supra note 28, at 448-49.
43. 491 F.2d at 694.
44. Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal
Case, 17 Am, CRiM. L. REV. 233, 238 (1979).
656 [Vol. 50
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much of an attorney's work is done before trial.45 The test was also criticized
for imposing too heavy a burden on defendants since it required them to show
that counsel's mistakes changed the nature of their trial into a farce and
mockery.46 After Gideon v. Wainwright4l extended the right to appointed
counsel to all indigents in felony cases, many courts found the farce and mock-
ery standard for ineffectiveness was no longer consistent with the quality of
representation to which defendants were entitled.48 Courts began to devise new
standards for judging ineffectiveness.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia-the
court which had originated the farce and mockery standard-abandoned it in
1967 and held that the appropriate standard for ineffective assistance is
whether gross incompetence blotted out the essence of a substantial defense.49
In 1970, the fifth circuit interpreted the right to counsel to mean counsel rea-
sonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. 0 By
1983, all the federal circuits had adopted some form of the reasonable attor-
ney standard, although the language used by the courts implied that they had,
in fact, adopted different standards.5
For example, the third circuit held counsel to a standard of normal com-
petency. 52 The court held the defendant is entitled to the exercise of the cus-
45. Id. at 239.
46. Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983).
47. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48. Bines, supra note 39, at 929.
49. Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
50. Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1970).
51. The language used by the circuits in formulating their tests varied consider-
ably. See, e.g., United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (Ist Cir. 1978) ("rea-
sonably competent assistance"); Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir.
1983) ("reasonably competent assistance"); Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th
Cir. 1970) ("counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective as-
sistance"); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) ("reasonably
effective assistance"); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641
(7th Cir.) ("minimum standard of professional representation"), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
876 (1975); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) ("customary
skills and diligence" of "a reasonably competent attorney"); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586
F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), ("reasonably competent and effective" as-
sistance) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th
Cir.) (en banc) (reasonably competent assistance), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
Justice Marshall, in his Strickland dissent, criticized the Court for its willingness
to characterize these seemingly different standards as really the same standard of rea-
sonableness. 104 S. Ct. at 2075, 2076 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Despite Marshall's
objections, it is difficult to find a real case of ineffectiveness whose outcome would be
different under the differing standards used by the circuit courts. Cf. 725 F.2d at 153-
55. One judge has referred to the various standards used by the circuit courts as noth-
ing more than a "semantic merry-go-round," suggesting the outcome of any case would
be the same under any standard used. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 206
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
52. 725 F.2d at 151 (citing Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir.
7
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tomary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place.3
The advantage of this standard was that it was a familiar civil malpractice
standard. Thus, its proponents argued courts could apply it more readily than
the more vague reasonableness standard.5
The fourth circuit devised the most detailed test of ineffectiveness, adopt-
ing a checklist of duties counsel must perform. The court held counsel must
confer with his client as often as is necessary, advise him of his rights, conduct
appropriate investigations, and allow sufficient time for reflection and prepara-
tion for trial.85
There are at least three possible approaches to the prejudice issue. 6 The
first approach is that a defendant need not show prejudice to obtain a reversal.
A second approach uses a harmless error analysis for ineffectiveness claims.
Once a defendant establishes that counsel's performance fell below the stan-
dard of effectiveness, the burden shifts to the government to prove lack of
prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. A third approach, and the one ultimately
adopted by Strickland, requires a defendant to demonstrate that his counsel
was ineffective and that this harmed him. The defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that the result of the challenged proceeding would
have been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness.5 7
Marshall's dissent advocates adoption of the first approach.58 Indeed, this
was the approach used by the sixth circuit. 9 The rationale for the no prejudice
approach is that the right to counsel is too important to require defendants to
also show harm flowing from abridgement of the right.6 0 Moreover, determin-
ing whether there was prejudice may be difficult.6 1 Finally, Marshall notes
that the no prejudice approach ensures that both innocent and guilty defen-
dants are tried using fundamentally fair procedures. 2 The chief disadvantage
of this approach is that it could result in a large number of reversals in cases
where the ineffectiveness did not affect the result of the proceeding. Judicial
resources would be wasted in retrying cases.
1970) (en banc)).
53. Bines, supra note 39, at 932.
54. Gard, supra note 34, at 495.
55. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968). The standards adopted by the court are virtually identical to those of the
A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
D1FENSE FUNCTION (1971), quoted in Gard, supra note 34, at 496. In later cases, the
Fourth Circuit emphasized that its checklist approach was consistent with a "normal
competency" standard. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
56. Comment, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relieffrom Conviction:
Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 72 (1977).
57. 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
58. Id. at 2077 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
60. Comment, supra note 55, at 76.
61. Id.
62. 104 S. Ct. at 2077 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 50
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The fourth circuit used the harmless error approach. 3 Proponents of this
approach pointed to Chapman v. California4 as mandating a harmless error
analysis.6 5 The advantage of the approach was that it avoided automatic rever-
sals in cases where the ineffectiveness could be proven to have been harmless
while relieving the defendant of the difficult burden of showing that the out-
come of his trial would have been different.'
6
The third approach, requiring the defendant to prove both ineffectiveness
and prejudice, was the most common among the circuit courts. 7 The chief
advantage of this approach was that it deterred insubstantial claims by requir-
ing defendants to prove the ineffectiveness affected the outcome of the
proceedings.
The circuit court which ruled on Strickland devised a unique approach to
prejudice which apparently falls in between the second and third approaches.
The court rejected the outcome-determinative test of the third approach be-
cause it required defendant to carry too great a burden. The court rejected the
second approach's shifting of the burden of proof to the state to show harmless
error because evidence of counsel's performance was more accessible to the
defendant.6 8 Instead, the court held defendant need only show that counsel's
ineffectiveness resulted in substantial disadvantage to the course of the de-
fense, rather than changed the outcome of the proceeding.6 9 After this show-
ing, the state has the opportunity to prevail if it can show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the outcome of the proceedings would not have been altered but for
the ineffectiveness of counsel.70
Strickland v. Washington announced a uniform framework for analyzing
ineffectiveness claims. The Court held that the proper standard for attorney
performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. The Court stated that
the reasonableness test should be applied by deciding whether counsel's per-
formance so impaired the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.7 ' The defendant
must show that counsel's performance fell below this standard of reasonable-
ness.72 The Court rejected as inappropriate the checklist approach used by the
fourth circuit for several reasons. First, the Court believed such an approach
could hamper defense counsel's efforts by directing attention away from advo-
63. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968).
64. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
65. Comment, supra note 56, at 84.
66. Id. at 84, 85.
67. Id. at 73.
68. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1261 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
69. 693 F.2d at 1262.
70. Id.
71. 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
72. Id. at 2065.
1985]
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cacy of the defendant's case.73 Second, the Court noted that the purpose of the
sixth amendment is to guarantee defendants a fair trial, not to improve the
general quality of legal assistance.7 4 Third, the Court feared that a checklist
approach would encourage ineffective assistance claims since counsel's failure
to perform any listed duty would give rise to a claim. 7" The Court believed the
better approach was to judge counsel's actions by whether counsel performed
reasonably considering all the circumstances of the case. 75
The Court emphasized that the reviewing court must give wide discretion
to counsel to develop trial strategy and tactics in order to discount the effect of
hindsight." Thus, there is a presumption that counsel's performance was
reasonable. 78
On the prejudice issue, the Court held that the defendant must show a
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2066.
76. Justice Marshall in his dissent harshly criticized the Court's adoption of a
reasonableness standard since Marshall believed this standard was too vague for lower
courts to apply and would stunt the development of more specific standards. Id. at 2075
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall favored the development of more particular stan-
dards like the fourth circuit's checklist approach. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text. Marshall believed either the Supreme Court or the lower courts should attempt to
develop guidelines for attorneys to follow to avoid claims of ineffectiveness. 104 S. Ct.
at 2076. Marshall believed a guideline approach would help improve the quality of
legal assistance, especially for indigent defendants who must rely on appointed attor-
neys. Id. at 2075. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
The majority disposed of Marshall's arguments by stating that the purpose of the
sixth amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation. Its purpose is to
ensure criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The Court empha-
sized that a fair trial means one which can be relied on as having produced a just
result. Id. at 2064. The Court believed that guidelines for attorney performance such as
those proposed by the A.B.A. should not be made part of sixth amendment doctrine
because any specific list of duties could not take into account all the possible cases that
might arise. Finally, the majority suggested that imposing detailed guidelines on attor-
neys would impair counsel's constitutionally protected independence. Id. at 2065.
The Court's emphasis that the sixth amendment's purpose is to ensure that defen-
dants receive a fair trial is reminiscent of the old cases decided under the farce and
mockery standard. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. However, Strick-
land's reasonableness test is broader than the farce and mockery standard since Strick-
land's test includes the attorney's performance both before and after trial. It is also
true that the reasonableness standard is an easier test for parties making an ineffective-
ness claim to meet than the stricter farce and mockery standard. See supra notes 43-47
and accompanying text.
77. 104 S. Ct. at 2065. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
78. 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Justice Marshall objected to this presumption of reason-
ableness because he feared it would place too heavy a burden of proof on parties mak-
ing an ineffectiveness claim. Marshall believed the real reason for the Court's imposing
a presumption of reasonableness was the Court's belief that lower courts would be
flooded with ineffectiveness claims without such a presumption for claimants to over-
come. Marshall had confidence that the lower courts could root out meritless claims
without such a presumption. Id. at 2078 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.79 The Court defined "reasonable
probability" as that which would undermine confidence in the outcome.80
Thus, the Court rejected both the no prejudice approach of the sixth circuit
and the harmless error approach of the fourth circuit.
The Court stated that in a limited class of cases, defendant need not show
prejudice to obtain a reversal of conviction. Prejudice is presumed in cases
where a defendant has been denied the right to counsel altogether, either actu-
ally or constructively."" Prejudice is also presumed where the state has unduly
interfered with counsel's assistance.82 The Court believed these situations were
so likely to be prejudicial that case-by-case inquiry was not necessary. The
Court noted that these types of sixth amendment violations were easy to iden-
tify and prevent.8 3
Moreover, the Court stated that prejudice should be presumed where de-
fendant's counsel was operating under an actual conflict of interest.8 The
Court noted that an attorney's duty of loyalty was perhaps the most basic
obligation owed to a client. The Court believed that since attorneys had a duty
to avoid conflicts and trial courts had the ability to make early inquiries in
cases where conflicts were likely to arise, a rule of presumed prejudice was
justified. However, the Court emphasized that the rule of presumed prejudice
would not be applied as strictly in conflicts cases as it would in cases where a
defendant was denied counsel or where the state impaired counsel's assistance.
To have the benefit of the presumed prejudice rule, a defendant must show
that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual con-
flict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance.85
79. Id. at 2068. The Court rejected a strict outcome-determinative test for
prejudice as imposing too heavy a burden on defendants. Id. at 2069.
80. Id. at 2068.
81. Id. at 2067. The easiest case would obviously be one in which counsel is
absent from an entire proceeding. More likely to occur, however, are cases in which the
defendant is denied counsel at some critical stage. See, e.g., Geders v. United States,
425 U.S. 80 (1976) (Court held that a trial judge's order to a defendant not to consult
with his lawyer during a regular overnight recess, called while the defendant was on
the stand and before cross-examination was to begin, violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel). For a discussion of the presumed prejudice rule by the
Supreme Court, see United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984).
82. 104 S. Ct. at 2067. See, e.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)
(Court held that a total denial of the opportunity for final summation in a criminal
case deprived the defendant of the basic right to make his defense and denied him the
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment).
83. 104 S. Ct. at 2067. The cases are easy to identify and prevent because in
each of these types of cases it is the state which is unduly interfering with counsel's
performance and counsel's relationship with the client. By contrast, in a typical ineffec-
tiveness case, the state may have no knowledge that counsel is inadequate. For exam-
ple, it would be difficult for a trial judge to know whether an attorney has adequately
investigated a case.
84 Id.
85 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980). Why the Strickland
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Strickland v. Washington should end the confusion that has clouded the
law of ineffective assistance. The Court's holding that the proper standard for
attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance should stop the
dispute over the standard required by the sixth amendment.86 Most significant
is Strickland's resolution of the conflicting approaches on the issue of
prejudice that were applied by the circuit courts. 87 All courts will now be able
to follow the Strickland rule that a defendant making an ineffectiveness claim
must show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the chal-
lenged proceeding would have been different but for counsel's inadequate as-
sistance.88 By adopting a uniform framework for analyzing ineffectiveness
claims, Strickland should allow lower courts to judge more confidently thse
sixth amendment cases.
J. GREGORY MERMELSTEIN
Court was willing to presume prejudice in cases where counsel has breached the duty
of loyalty, but not in cases where counsel has breached the duty to inv stigate, is not
entirely clear. The Court seemed to suggest that the duty of loyalty is more fundamen-
tal than the duty to investigate. A more likely reason may be that it is easier at an
earlier stag- in the proceeding to identify cases where a conflict of interest is present
than cases where counsel has not investigated adequately. The Court may also have
wanted to leave its Cuyler decision intact by drafting its Strickland opinion somewhat
narrowly.
86. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
88. 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
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